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Introduction 
 
The Syrian civil war has been ongoing for nearly two years now, this 
conflict is extremely violent and perpetuated by various foreign interests backing 
the various sides directly involved. As with Libya, there was an initial attempt to 
allow the United States and its allies a free hand to wage an open military 
campaign against the Bashar al-Assad regime and aiding the various insurgent and 
terrorist forces aligned against him through the United Nations Security Council. 
Although, it is likely that this would be conducted under the guise of humanitarian 
intervention that was intended to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people, an act 
of a good global citizen within the framework of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  
This  article  starts  with  the  premise  that  mass  media  and  journalism  in  the  
West is not acting in the capacity as a fourth estate (a check and balance against 
the abuses and excesses of the state), but rather to promote a narrow set of policy 
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interests by the state. For example, the advancement of the notion of regime 
changes through a concerted information war effort, which has been proclaimed by 
the United States and its allies in the Syrian civil war. To do this, public support 
needs to be shaped and then harnessed in order to present the facade of public 
consensus.  
Mass media play a vital role as they permit audiences that are remote from 
events, such as this civil war, to connect with it. However, this is done through a 
very carefully chosen strategy of pathos rhetoric, labelling and descriptions in 
order to manage how the public view and respond to the different actors.  
In order to reveal these manipulations it is necessary to deconstruct the so-
called popular view of the Syrian conflict, which castes Assad and his forces as the 
villains in this story, and the insurgents/terrorists aligned against him as the heroes. 
There is an increasing trend to try and present this conflict as entering the final 
phase, and that regime change is inevitable. At the same time, there is a concerted 
effort to try and rally public opinion in to accepting direct military intervention in 
this  war.  As  such,  there  needs  to  be  a  justification  for  this  move.  There  are  two  
discernible tracks, one is the ‘humanitarian’ line and invokes the notion that this is 
done for the good of the Syrian people. The other is the ‘containment’ track that 
focuses upon the idea that urgent military action is needed to prevent effects and 
threats from going beyond the Syrian borders, Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs) and the regionalisation of the war provide two such examples.  
 
Methodological and Theoretical Considerations 
 
This article uses various information sources that include theoretical and 
conceptual literature on media, communication and armed conflict. Other sources 
used  are  media  articles  and  reports  by  think  tanks  and  other  organisations.  The  
media articles have been sourced through news aggregate services and via targeted 
internet searches for particular events or topics. It is intended to analyse the media 
and other public material from the point of view of propaganda, and its potential 
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influence on targeted publics in order to try and advance the ultimate goal of 
achieving regime change in Syria.  
Philip Taylor described propaganda as being a deliberate communication 
ploy to attempt to influence the way that a target audience thinks and behaves, 
which benefits the agenda of the originator of the message (Taylor 2003: 6). 
However, propaganda is usually effective only when an audience is not aware it is 
being targeted. Should it become aware of the fact, they may seek to go in another 
direction than in the one they were being steered. Propaganda can be used in the 
context of ‘facilitating’ the democratic process by influencing public opinion on 
policy. This issue has been raised by the prominent public relations scholars 
Edward Bernays and Walter Lippmann in the 1920s. Walter Lippmann speaks of 
the divide between what he terms as ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders.’ That is, the ruling 
elite of a country (insiders) and the citizenry (outsiders). The insiders possess the 
expertise and knowledge for running a country and the citizens (at best) are 
partially informed about the affairs of state and are manipulated by the insiders 
(Lippmann, 1927). By keeping the citizens partially informed or uniformed they 
are easier to influence in terms of their opinions held.  
Within  this  context,  the  role  and  nature  of  public  opinion  and  its  
management has become a critical issue within the political sphere. This is owing 
to the nature of modern politics that rests upon the notion of working with the 
perception  of  public  consent  (McNair,  2007).  In  the  context  of  war  and  the  
relationship between politics and journalism, Sarah Oates observes that there has 
been a “marked decrease in openness and freedom of information in the coverage 
of international conflicts.” And the decisive factor that determines the nature of the 
conflict’s coverage is the way in which states choose to frame the named conflict 
(Oates, 2009: 113).  
Oates also makes some revealing remarks concerning the political 
(governmental) point of view concerning media coverage of conflicts. Evidence 
exists that mass media provide “quite limited” and “biased” information on 
conflicts, yet they are still criticised and condemned by the state for not showing 
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enough faith or commitment to the cause (of war) (Oates, 2009: 129). This implies 
that the state seeks to create a balance (in its favour) whereby public information is 
used to support policy. This demonstrates the considerable influence of politics in 
shaping commitment and resolve in initiating and prosecuting armed conflict 
(Simons (B), 2012).  
The question is how to realise intended policy through the use of perception 
management and other forms of manipulation? This is answered, to an extent, by 
Michael Ignatieff who discusses this issue within the frame of terrorism. Although, 
this is equally true for armed conflict in general.  
The first  challenge that  a  terrorist  emergency poses to democracy is  to this  
system of adversarial justification. The machinery of legislative deliberation and 
judicial review grinds slowly. Emergencies demand rapid action. Hence they 
require the exercise of prerogative. Presidents and prime ministers have to take 
action first and submit questions later. But too much prerogative can be bad for 
democracy itself (Ignatieff, 2005: 2).  
Although related to the context of terrorism, armed conflict in general 
creates the emergence of emergency or a crisis. By reality and by perception there 
is a threat to values (human life or an ideology for example), an urgent call for 
action in order to meet the threat, and a shortage of time in which to act. This 
situation creates an ideal environment reducing civil liberties and rolling back 
democracy. A concrete example is the United States involvement in its military 
action against Gadaffi’s forces in Libya, the length of the operation violated the US 
Constitution. Yet there have been no repercussions for the Obama administration 
and limited public outcry. Traditional mass media have been failing in their duty to 
public interest in favour of a narrow range of political interests. 
The emergence of new and social media has shifted the time frame of news 
reporting and made the process more open (to scrutiny and criticism). Initially this 
new form did cause a lot of concern for governments (Gowing, 2009). A good 
example of this was the emergence of groups such as Wikileaks, Media Lens and 
others that have challenged the opaque world of news production. An important 
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observation made regarding the role of information and communication during or 
immediately preceding war (information war) is intended to mobilise the public as 
spectators of the conflict and not as active participants on the battlefield (Tumber& 
Webster, 2006: 165). This means their consent (or at least lack of resistance) to 
engaging in or continuation of a war is required to provide a sense of legitimacy, 
and not the public being actively involved in the physical fighting.  
How is this ‘consent’ achieved through the use of information and 
communication? The answer can be found in part through the use and effect of 
rhetoric. Three types of rhetoric are of interest within the frame of this article – 
ethos, pathos and logos. Ethos concerns the dimension whereby the credibility of 
the orator is intended to be the means of persuading the audience. A logical and 
sound argument serves as the basis for logos. The use of emotion, both positive 
and negative, is the basis for persuasion in pathos (Tuman, 2010: 38-39; Simons, 
2006: 580-581). Use of definitions and labels is important as they create an 
environment of apparently agreed upon perceptions and understandings. In some 
way, it makes the world around us much more clear and easy to understand 
(Tuman, 2010: 46). The word apparent is used to denote that the process of 
arriving at the agreed upon definitions and labels is not an equal one, the state with 
media collaboration is in a much better position to determine this than the public 
owing to access to means of mass communication.  
A label is not a neutral act as it carries with it a set of values and 
expectations when invoked. And thereby gives greater context and meaning to the 
environment in which it is located. When successfully applied, labels and 
definitions also have an effect of narrowing the permitted discourse concerning a 
person or an event. Tuman notes that “definitions and labels create possibilities for 
empowering people, causes, issues, and movements or taking way power from the 
same” (Tuman, 2010: 47). This is most evident within the Syrian conflict, where 
communication from the US and its allies are directed at empowering the insurgent 
forces, the case for direct military intervention (but through use of labels or 
descriptions such as Responsibility to Protect or protecting the civilian population 
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to create the facade of lack of underlying national interest) and for disempowering 
the cause of Assad and the Syrian security forces. It also creates the situation were 
those opposed to military intervention or supporters of Assad are accused or 
supporting tyranny or mass murder, thereby becoming victims of labelling 
themselves. The rhetoric used against them has no firm basis for truth other than 
the pathos or ethos that is being used by those with vested interests and the likely 
agenda (policy) of regime change.  
Deconstructing the ‘Popular’ Understanding of the Syrian Conflict 
The  vision  that  is  promoted  by  the  United  States  and  its  allies  is  that  the  
insurgency against Bashar Al Assad is done by democratically minded forces and 
that the revolution (now civil war) originated spontaneously by domestic (within 
Syria) actors that are seeking freedom from oppression.1 Syria was lumped 
together in a branded series of revolutions called the Arab Spring, which was 
meant to convey hope and progress across the Middle East/North African against 
selected regimes that were designated for change.  
Journalists and politicians paint a very simplistic picture of the conflict for 
the global audiences, which are intended to garner public opinion in favour of the 
Anti-Assad forces, which include a number of terrorist organisations.2 Insurgents 
are characterised as the underdogs, but democratic and freedom seeking. Assad and 
the governmental forces are portrayed as corrupt, only self-serving, brutal and 
dictators (Simons (a), 2012). War crimes and atrocities are generally blamed on 
Assad and the government forces, those committed by the forces aligned against 
Assad are often glossed over or ignored by the corporate media and politicians in 
the West. A fog is deliberately created around this conflict in order to generate an 
                                                             
1Why Syria Matters, USA Today, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012/09/27/why-syria-
matters-from-arab-spring-to-assad-regime-and-us-impact/57848088/1, 27 September 2012 (accessed 17 February 
2013); Overview, Syria – Uprising and Civil War, The New York Times, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html?s=newest&, no date 
given (accessed 14 February 2013); Turkel, O., Syria After the Arab Spring: What is Happening, and What is Going 
to Happen?, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2951/-syria-after-the-arab-
spring-what-is-happening-and-what-is-going-to-happen.html, 15 March 2012 (accessed 17 February 2013)  
2 Staff Writers, Zarqawi’s Legacy: Jihadist Rebels in Syria, UPI, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/01/09/Zarqawis-legacy-Jihadist-rebels-in-Syria/UPI-
98601357754164/, 9 January 2013 (accessed 17 February 2013)  
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emotional effect. The figure of 60-70000 casualties is given for the number killed 
during the conflict so far. What this large figure hides are those killed by insurgent 
forces and government security forces killed. Without expressly stating this, the 
impression is that this is the number of civilians killed by the Syrian government 
forces.1 
The role of perception in the propaganda war and its affect upon 
international opinion is very important. There is a lot at stake, which makes the 
temptation of using fake or false material greater. Various videos showing 
beatings, killings and various forms of destruction are prevalent on the internet, 
which are designed to generate sympathy or hatred for one side or the other. One 
photo that was circulated in the international press was alleged to have been taken 
in the wake of a massacre in the town of Houla in May 2012, in fact was taken in 
Iraq in 2003. Another video that was circulated for one year in Syria featured a 
beheading by a chainsaw, it was alleged that Gaddafi’s forces were responsible. 
However, the crime was carried out by drug lords in Mexico five years earlier.2 
This makes the ‘fog of war’ even thicker, and also demonstrates that journalists are 
not doing their basic professional duties, such as the verification of information 
and other material.  
The opposition forces have been accepted by various Western countries as 
being the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. Various leaders of the 
Syrian opposition in exile have repeated promises that the future Syria will 
guarantee equal rights to all Syrians regardless of religion or ethnicity.3 The 
insurgent and terrorist forces claim to represent the Syrian people, many of whom 
do not trust them (with good reason). Yet very little, other than some feeble 
                                                             
1 Wagner, D., The Dark Side of the Free Syrian Army, The Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/dark-side-free-syrian_b_2380399.html, 31 December 2012 
(accessed 8 January 2013)  
2 Shelton, T., The Most Disturbing Fake Videos Making Rounds in Syria, Global Post, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/syria/121109/fake-syria-videos-images, 12 
November 2012 (accessed 18 February 2013) 
3 Barnard, A., Syrian Rebels Find Hearts and Minds Elusive, The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-finds-hearts-and-minds-are-
elusive.html?pagewanted=all, 15 January 2013 (accessed 16 January 2013) 
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superficial attempts at exploring policy platforms, do not get to the root of why 
there is a lack of trust.  
A lot of evidence is already circulating that undermines the Western 
narrative of the existence of a peaceful, democratic and unified resistance to Assad. 
For instance, one only needs to look at countless horrific videos available on You 
Tube to understand the true nature of the Free Syrian Army and those other forces 
fighting Assad to realise the fallacy of those hollow statements - 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jt_0KHDlods and the following video, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rU98OEdCsnE are  two  examples  of  the  many  
war crimes that have been committed. These war crimes have generally gone 
unchallenged by Western media or politicians that continue to portray these Anti-
Assad forces as being democratic and inclusive. In the first video, a large number 
of modern and brand new American made small arms are readily seen, and only 
two Kalashnikovs, which seems to cast doubt upon the official US government 
claims that no weapons are being supplied to the insurgent and terrorist forces, and 
only non-lethal supplies are being given.1 Yet it is simultaneously admitted that 
they ‘indirectly’ arming the Anti-Assad groups.  
Propaganda and opinion continues to saturate Western coverage of the 
conflict, for example, on 13 February 2013 at 2200 on TV4 news in Sweden, an 
interview was conducted by Swedish journalists with an armed group who tried to 
demonstrate their good treatment of prisoners of war. A number of prisoners were 
shown,  and  one  in  particular  was  focussed  upon.  ‘George’  was  identified  as  a  
Christian, and was participating in ‘voluntary’ Koran education, commenting that 
he read the holy book now. These journalists failed in their journalistic duty by not 
asking basic questions. One pertinent question that immediately comes to mind 
would be what is the likely consequence of a prisoner refusing to participate in this 
training? The likely answer would be summary execution, such as is seen in the 
numerous videos previously discussed.  
                                                             
1Schmitt, E., CIA Said to be Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition, The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrian-
rebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 21 June 2012 (accessed 17 February 2013) 
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In order to reduce any perceived threat, the insurgent and terrorist forces 
operating in the Syrian conflict are referred to with the blanket term as Opposition 
Forces (to Assad), those sources that the Western media quotes without any checks 
or balances (such as verification) are referred to as being Opposition Activists. In 
many cases there is no critical view of their activities or possible issues of conflict 
of interest. For instance, what is the agenda and affiliation of the ‘opposition 
activists’? In addition to the above mentioned war crimes being committed by the 
‘opposition forces’, there are other acts that suggest a less than democratic 
observance by these groups. Human Rights Watch has been documenting a number 
of cases in Syria, committed by the ‘opposition forces’, whereby historical and 
religious sites that belong to other groups have been deliberately destroyed or 
looted after those areas were abandoned by the government forces.1 These actions 
hardly agree with the rhetoric of those insurgents that claim that they represent the 
interests of all peoples and groups in Syria (an inclusive and open approach to 
society), in fact there are a number of parallels here with the destruction of the 
ancient Buddha statues in Afghanistan!  
 
Moving Towards the ‘End Game’? 
A number of key narratives have appeared in the Syrian civil war, which are 
intended to serve as informational support for the anti-governmental forces 
fighting in Syria and to support (i.e.) legitimise the support of those forces by 
Western and Middle Eastern states. They are intended to serve as a ‘moral 
compass’ to the international publics (to prompt support for those terrorist and 
insurgent forces), to entertain the unthinkable (provoking and then becoming 
directly involved in a civil war in the region) when the public is war wary, and to 
give the impression that the Assad regime is on the point of collapse (so therefore, 
why support a ‘dead’ man?).  
Syria is a Threat to Regional Stability 
                                                             
1 Syria: Attacks on Religious Sites Raise Tensions, Human Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/23/syria-attacks-religious-sites-raise-tensions, 23 January 2013 (accessed 24 
January 2013)  
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Many remarks have been made that suggest Syria is the source of intentional 
and unintentional regional instability. One line of argument is that this is a 
conscious and deliberate act by Assad and the Syrian government in order to draw 
attention away from their desperate situation. Another line of argument is that this 
spread of instability is not intentional or deliberate, but a result of the conflict 
spilling over borders from Syria to her neighbours. Therefore, the logic goes, 
efforts are needed to resolve the crisis sooner than later in order to prevent a wider 
regional conflict/instability. This is in spite of the basic fact that those who claim 
rhetorically that they are seeking to resolve this conflict are in fact indirectly and 
directly involved in exacerbating the conflict by arming and supplying the 
insurgents.  
Blame for the possible regionalisation of the Syrian conflict is laid with 
Assad, who is portrayed and losing power and being desperate (therefore 
dangerous and unpredictable according to the follow-on logic). “With every month 
that passes, Syria’s neighbours become more edgy and the risk of contagion from 
the conflict grows. [...] A regionalisation of the conflict looks increasingly 
impossible to prevent because there is no end in sight for Syria’s war.”1 It  is  
interesting to note that the civil war in Syria, which is perpetuated by numerous 
foreign interests, is compared to a contagion. Blame for the possible 
regionalisation is assigned to the ongoing civil war in Syria, and not the various 
interests that manage to keep the conflict alive.  
Turkey has been actively involved in supporting the Syrian insurgent forces 
with safe havens, weapons and other supplies, they have also been sheltering a 
large number of Syrian refugees and was one of the countries that actively called 
for military intervention in Syria. But there have been a number of costs for the 
support, which has witnessed increasing instability in the country. A columnist for 
the newspaper Milliyet, DoganHeper wrote that “Turkey’s Syria policy has failed 
[...] It has turned our neighbours into enemies. We have been left alone in the 
                                                             
1Khalaf, R., Israel and Assad Raise Stakes on Syria, The Financial Times, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aab3be8e-6e16-11e2-983d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2LHWORf78, 3 February 
2013 (accessed 4 February 2013) 
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world.”1 The theatrical facade of the deployment of Patriot missile batteries to 
Turkey was meant to demonstrate that Syria was a threat to Turkey, without 
mentioning the various measures the Turkish government had engaged in to 
undermine the Assad regime, which is portrayed by the media as being legitimate 
(retaliation by Syria is not legitimate according to their logic). To illustrate this 
point, the shooting down of a Turkish reconnaissance jet in Syrian airspace was 
seen as being a provocation by the Syrians, and not by the Turks for violating 
Syrian airspace in the first instance.  
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have all been involved in supplying men, arms 
and material to various armed factions in Syria. The Iranian interests are generally 
characterized as being to support their national interests by keeping their ally alive, 
which gives access to Lebanon and the possibility to launch attacks against Israel.2 
The Persian Gulf States are recruiting and building up Sunni militias to fight 
against Assad’s forces. This is not condemned in itself as being a blatant act of 
interference in a civil war, but as merely ill-advised as it is likely to further 
increase sectarian tensions in Lebanon as well as Syria.3 The level of reporting is 
inconsistent and not objective, some states have a ‘legitimate’ right to interfere in 
another state’s internal conflict and others do not. Yet there is no attempt to justify 
why this is so. 
Western politicians have been voicing ‘concerns’ about possible spillover 
effects of the civil war too. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stated publicly 
after an air raid by the Syrian Air Force on the Palestinian refugee camp Yarmuk 
(in Damascus) that “we must do everything to avoid anything that could lead to a 
regional flare-up.” Labelling the attack as ‘scandalous’ and accusing Assad of 
                                                             
1Arango, T., Turkish Public Sours on Syrian Uprising, The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/world/europe/turks-weary-of-leaders-support-for-syria-
uprising.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 18 September 2012 (accessed 13 February 2013)  
2 Staff Writers, Slaying Hints Iran Hikes Backing for Assad, Space War (UPI), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Slaying_hints_Iran_hikes_backing_for_Assad_999.html, 14 February 2013 
(accessed 15 February 2013) 
3 Staff Writers, Syria: Iran, Saudis Beef up Rival Militias, Space War (UPI), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Syria_Iran_Saudis_beef_up_rival_militias_999.html, 28 January 2013 
(accessed 29 January 2013) 
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wanting to inflame the situation.1 The outrage seems to be less than genuine, 
especially in light of the level of foreign interference in Syria and France’s 
involvement in Libya and other conflict zones. However, it is the intended 
appearance that is meant to count.  
One of the countries stands to be a significant loser in the Arab Spring 
process is Israel. The predictable secular dictators on her borders are steadily being 
replaced more radical and religiously oriented rulers (of now volatile and 
extremely unstable states). One of Israel’s chief concerns is the arsenal of the 
Syrian military (including chemical weapons) falling in to the ‘wrong’ hands. The 
former head of Mossad, Ephraim Halevy noted that “From all standpoints, it would 
have preferred that this conflict had not broken out in the first place, and for Israel 
to continue to enjoy the absolute quiet along the armistice lines drawn between the 
two states following the (1973) Yom Kippur War.”2 Other neighbouring countries 
are being affected too. 
Lebanon is a country that has been torn by violence in the recent past and 
continues to be in a very volatile state. A number of articles have accused Syria of 
stoking  tensions  there  for  the  benefit  of  the  Assad  regime.  The  assassination  and  
funeral of Brigadier-General Wissam al-Hassan, the head of Lebanon’s internal 
security forces sparked gun battles between various militias. Of interest was an 
observation that there were more political and Islamic flags than national ones at 
his funeral.3 This is indicative of a growing sectarian divide and radicalisation that 
can once again ignite more fully. Jordan has also experienced violence and 
instability  as  a  result  of  the  war  on  the  other  side  of  its  border.  In  spite  of  the  
prevailing narrative of Assad’s responsibility for the destabilising situation, a Fox 
News article actually laid the blame with insurgents (trying to enter Syria from 
                                                             
1Staff Writers, End is Near for Regime of Syria’s Assad: France, Space War, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/End_is_near_for_regime_of_Syrias_Assad_France_999.html, 16 December 
2012 (accessed 8 January 2013)  
2 Staff Writers, Israel Preparing for Post-Assad Syria Chaos, Space War (AFP), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Israel_preparing_for_post-Assad_Syria_chaos_999.html, 4 February 2013 
(accessed 13 February 2013) 
3Alami, M., Syria’s Civil War Spills Over into Lebanon, USA Today, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/22/lebanon-erupts-in-fighting/1649839/, 22 October 2012 
(accessed 19 February 2013) 
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Jordanian side of  the border)  killing a Jordanian soldier.  In spite  of  this  the State 
Department issued the statement that “the onus for this kind of violence rests 
squarely on the Assad regime.”1 In effect, this makes the Syrian government 
responsible not only for their actions, but for those forces opposing them too! 
 
 
 
Assad is Finished 
There is a lot of effort, which borders along the lines of Psyops or 
disinformatsiya,2 focussing on the supposed instability (and therefore ‘imminent 
collapse) of the Assad regime. An example of this appeared in January 2013 in 
Albawaba, which alleged that Assad and his family were living onboard a warship 
that was guarded by Russians. The conveyed idea is that it is no longer safe for 
Assad and his family on Syrian soil, and that he has no trust in the reliability of 
Syrian security forces ability to protect him or the environment he is in. However, 
this ‘tip’ was given by intelligence sources to a Saudi Arabian newspaper.3 Given 
that Saudi Arabia is one of the countries actively engaged in seeking to overthrow 
Assad, this information should be treated with great caution as it suits their 
political agenda to try and magnify the possibility of the Assad regime’s 
‘imminent’ collapse owing to the notion and role played by intangible elements in 
war. Other governments, for instance, may be more inclined to back what they 
perceive to be the winning side in the conflict. Thus intangible elements can be 
converted in to more tangible actions and results.  
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Syria Brief (July 2012) is 
typical of Western ‘analysis’ of the situation in the conflict (and with similar 
                                                             
1Syria’s Civil War Spills Violence Across Borders into Jordan, Lebanon, Fox News (AP), 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/10/22/jordanian-soldier-killed-in-clash-with-militants-trying-to-slip-into-
syria/, 22 October 2012 (accessed 19 February 2013) 
2Psyops is short for the term psychological operations, which is directed against enemy forces to disrupt their 
decision making capacity and in this instance the unity of Syria’s political and military elite. Disinformatsiya is the 
intentional spreading of false or misleading information by an organisation in order to influence the decision making 
process of the intended target audience that would benefit the agenda of the originator.  
3He’s on a Boat! Bashar al Assad Allegedly Living on a Russian Warship, Editor’s Choice, Albawaba, 
www.albawaba.com/editorchoice/assad-russia-ship-463592, 15 January 2013 (accessed 18 January 2013)  
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echoes to the analysis and predictions of Gaddafi’s ‘imminent’ fall that came much 
later than first predicted. This as much about affecting Assad’s intangible assets as 
it  is  about  reporting ‘news’ or  ‘facts’.  For external  audiences,  if  they believe in a 
collapse they are more likely to commit to supporting the insurgents and 
renouncing support for Assad. This has the effect of creating the facade of 
legitimacy for those insurgent forces through creating an impact on international 
opinion. The situation is different for domestic actors, who are potentially likely to 
want to support what is perceived to be the winning side or at least to weaken their 
resistance to the insurgent forces by sapping the will to continue to fight.  
One of the characterisations of Assad that surfaces, but without any 
substantiation, is that he is a weakling and a coward.1 There is no direct evidence 
to support this claim, other than something that is uttered by those with an interest 
to see his regime overthrown. This is intended to erode support and belief among 
the people, administration and security forces in the leadership of Assad through 
the use of attempted labelling. Comparing Assad’s situation with that of the Alamo 
is additionally, rather meaningless, but the effect is intended to be emotionally and 
not logically based.  
A lot of opinion is presented on behalf of other parties in this conflict by 
Western politicians that are speaking on behalf of Syrians or other countries, such 
as Russia (with or without the knowledge or consent from these parties). A prime 
example of this was when the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, spoke in 
December 2012. “I think the end is approaching for Mr Bashar al Assad. [...] You 
have seen, even if it’s controversial, even the Russians see it coming.”2 If subjected 
to critical analysis these words don’t hold much weight, however, within a pathos 
laden environment it is less likely to be critically evaluated. For instance, Fabius 
speaks on behalf of Russia, but there is no effort made to substantiate this claim. 
                                                             
1Zumwalt, J., Awaiting Departure of Syria’s ‘Coward of the Alamo’, UPI, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/01/15/Outside-View-Awaiting-departure-of-Syrias-
Coward-of-the-Alamo/UPI-88281358226240/, 15 January 2013 (accessed 16 January 2013)  
2Staff Writers, End is Near for Regime of Syria’s Assad: France, Space War, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/End_is_near_for_regime_of_Syrias_Assad_France_999.html, 16 December 
2012 (accessed 8 January 2013)  
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The belief and effect lies in the potential power of ethos, power of persuasion 
given his position.  
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction ... Again! 
With echoes going back for the justification for invading, and then 
subsequently occupying Iraq, the issue of the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) has surfaced again with the various scenarios for directly 
attacking Syria. Media articles, reports and statements by political and military 
actors mostly allude to the presence and possible use of chemical weapons by the 
Assad regime, and possible military responses to stave off their use or as a form of 
retaliation after their use.  
One of the most detailed accounts of chemical weapons and various possible 
military options by the West can be found in RUSI’s 2012 report the Syria 
Briefing. Paul Schulte contributes a section, Syrian Chemical Weapons Stocks: A 
Choice of Risks and Evils (pp. 20-27). Interestingly, this section notes that it would 
be extremely difficult to justify owing to the absent Iraqi WMDs in the wake of the 
US-led invasion in March 2003 (p. 26). There is extensive playing of different 
scenarios throughout the section, but ultimately concludes that the Syrian security 
forces are unlikely to use these weapons on the battlefield (p. 22). A number of 
matters become evident in the analysis of this section, air strikes may be costly 
owing to Syrian air defence systems and the results would be difficult to confirm, 
and this is an unpopular and risky reason for embarking upon direct military 
intervention.  
A number of stories concerning the alleged presence and possible use of 
WMDs in Syria have been circulating through the mass media sphere, and the 
possible and calculated responses by various foreign actors. There were an 
increased number of these stories appearing in the media during the period 
December 2012 and January 2013. One such story covered the United Nations 
preparing to send chemical weapons kits to its monitors stationed in the Golan 
Heights monitoring mission. In the same article was a paragraph dedicated to an 
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accusation by the United States that it had intelligence showing “Syria was 
considering using its chemical weapons.”1 President Obama made a rhetorical 
condemnation of such a move in spite of the fact that nothing had happened, and 
remembering 10 years ago the United States had ‘irrefutable’ intelligence evidence 
of  WMDs  in  Iraq,  which  proved  to  be  false.  Yet  there  was  no  critical  review  or  
alternative information offered, the statement was received and repeated without 
any due journalistic rigour.  
This ‘news’ started a flurry of symbolic rhetoric and more questions than 
answers. In late November 2012, Israeli satellite imagery showed what appeared to 
be chemicals in preparation for what was thought to be their military use. The 
uncertainty soon disappeared from the information that was transformed in to a 
certainty. In connection with the chemical weapon threat, the Pentagon has even 
publicly stated that at least 75000 troops would be needed to ‘secure’ the stocks. 
The New York Times article also expressed doubts about the measures taken by 
the Syrian authorities to secure WMD stocks from Islamist extremists.2 Yet there is 
no reflection on the consequences of the West and its allies of arming those same 
insurgent groups that may just capture those chemical weapons, let alone placing 
all responsibility on the shoulders of any one national leader.  
In January the State Department was even forced to refute an allegation that 
Syria had used chemical weapons in December 2012. The basis of this story was a 
supposedly leaked State Department report that made the claim. The Foreign 
Policy magazine used this for the basis of a “compelling case” that Syrian 
government forces had used poison gas. The spokeswoman for the State 
Department, Victoria Nuland, stated “that report from Foreign Policy did not 
accurately convey the anecdotal information that we had received from a third 
                                                             
1 Staff Writers, UN Sending Chemical Weapons Kits to Syria Monitors, Space Wars (AFP), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/UN_sending_chemical_weapons_kits_to_Syria_monitors_999.html, 17 
December 2012 (accessed 8 January 2013) 
2 Schmitt, E. & Sanger, D. E., Hints of Syrian Chemical Weapons Push Sets off Global Effort to Stop it, The New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/world/middleeast/chemical-weapons-showdown-with-syria-
led-to-rare-accord.html?_r=0, 7 January 2013 (accessed 8 January 2013) 
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party regarding the alleged incident in Syria in December.”1 The US started to 
quickly cool the rhetoric though, the Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, tried to 
reassure that no ground troops would be sent to secure chemical weapons if the 
Syria government fell. “We are not working with options that involve boots on the 
ground,”2 This  may  be  an  indication  that  the  US  does  not  consider  the  situation  
ripe for direct military involvement yet, in spite of possessing military superiority. 
There is a likelihood of losses of military hardware and personnel, plus the 
prospect of becoming entangled in yet another intractable insurgency.  
Another very poor article that was based completely on hearsay and lacking 
in any sort of balance or scrutiny appeared in the Financial Times in January 2013. 
It accused Syria of harbouring up to 50 tonnes of unenriched uranium at an orchard 
where an alleged ‘secret uranium conversion site’ is located. A lot of 
unsubstantiated guesswork and rumours are generated about the site, which has a 
satellite views that shows some buildings and an orchard. Clearing of the orchard 
“for no apparent reason” and signs of defensive positions, together with possible 
signs of fighting are offered as ‘concrete proof’ of the sinister nature of the facility. 
The article even speculates as far as stating Iran may be intending to seize this 
alleged stockpile of uranium. In doing so, this article is bringing the spectre of the 
West’s long-time enemy into the picture for extra threat perception.3 The viewer 
comments were justifiably sceptical of the story, a number referring to the Iraqi 
WMDs some 10 years earlier.  
This particular ‘news’ story attracted the attention of the media watcher 
News Unspun that critically analysed the story methodically, exposing the fallacies 
and poor standards of journalism. The editors of News Unspun were fairly polite in 
their final assessment of the article penned by Blitz.  
                                                             
1 Staff Writers, ‘No Credible Evidence’ Syria Used Chemical Arms: US, Space War (AFP), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/No_credible_evidence_Syria_used_chemical_arms_US_999.html, 16 January 
2013 (accessed 17 January 2013)  
2 Wong, K., Panetta: No US Troops in Syria if Chemical Weapons Used, The Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/10/panetta-no-us-troops-syria-if-chemical-weapons-use/, 10 
January 2013 (accessed 11 January 2013) 
3 Blitz, J., Fears Raised Over Syria Uranium Stockpile, The Financial Times, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a450b660-5998-11e2-88a1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2LHWORf78, 8 January 2013 
(accessed 9 January 2013) 
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The  ‘concerns’  Blitz  reports  on  belong  to  his  sources,  so  it  is  their  
judgement, and not just his, which is premised on fallacy. Blitz, however, has 
based his entire argument, without criticism, on the opinions of these officials, and 
has further developed them into a foretelling narrative, one which doesn’t stand up 
to even the slightest scrutiny.1 
The use of such stories as WMDs seems to be directed at wider international 
publics by trying to create an environment of fear that implies the threat could go 
beyond the borders of Syria. For fear to be successful, people need to believe that 
something bad can possibly happen (such as a dirty bomb or chemical weapon 
attack), and that this source of threat can touch them personally. If successfully 
achieved (instilling a sense of fear), then a state of pathos becomes the primary 
element of persuasion, which makes an audience easier to ‘manage’.  
Options for Open Military Intervention  
The last narrative to be discussed is the issue of an open military attack 
against the Assad regime in Syria. This would be a departure from the current 
policy of covert indirect support to those forces opposing the Syrian government 
and more aligned to the Libya scenario. However, direct military intervention is 
hedged as being something that is not desired by the international community 
owing to the Global War On Terrorism that has been ongoing for over a decade, 
and with no end in sight or significant positive results to show for the investment 
of military power, money and lives lost. Thus there is a tendency to try and deliver 
a sense of an involuntary move towards military intervention by the West and its 
allies.  
For these reasons the question of some sort of western intervention in Syria 
has shifted from a predilection to stay out of the conflict in any physical sense to 
an awareness that intervention is looking increasingly likely. We are not moving 
towards intervention but intervention is certainly moving towards us. For western 
                                                             
1 Editors, Logical Fallacies: The Financial Times on Syria and Uranium Stockpiles, News Unspun, 
http://www.newsunspun.org/article/logical-fallacies-the-financial-times-on-syria-and-uranium-stockpiles, 10 
January 2013 (accessed 11 January 2013)  
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policy-makers the issue is rapidly resolving itself into questions over the purposes 
and most appropriate modes of intervention. Indeed, in some important respects, 
western intervention has already commenced (Clarke, 2012: 2).  
A mantra seems to have been chosen, and being repeated often throughout 
the brief. Intervention has chosen us, which implies that the West is not 
consciously seeking to be directly involved with some form of military 
intervention. In other words, the appearance of any form of Western national 
interest in Syria and the removal of Assad (as opposed to the stressed Chinese and 
Russian national interest in blocking a Libya scenario for Syria at the UN Security 
Council1) needs to be absent, and instead a reluctant, responsible global citizen 
acting in an unselfish manner is conveyed. This is complete nonsense, and can be 
quickly detected in the move away from the broad concept of whether to get 
directly involved or not to more specific issues of the exact nature of the planned 
intervention.  
Media reporting on international conflicts carries with it an implicitly 
expressed judgement on the justness or contra of the use of military force. This is 
evident in the use of labels and descriptions that can in turn describe victims and 
perpetrators, legitimate and criminal acts of war, which is uneven and dependent 
upon the actor that is the subject of the article. On the one side of the equation, 
actions of the identified ‘bad guy’ are intended to evoke outrage. The other side of 
the coin, the actions of the named ‘good guy’ are justified and rationalised and 
portrayed as being legitimate.2 There have been a plethora of opinion articles that 
have been urging the United States and its allies to become involved in direct 
military action against Assad as they had done against Gaddafi in Libya. The US 
motivations are promoted as being related to humanitarian concerns – to promote 
freedom and democracy. Urgency is often promoted as necessary to prevent a 
                                                             
1Sen, A. K., Russia, China Veto UN Resolution on Syria; More Than 250 Killed in Homs, The Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/4/assad-forces-commit-massacre-syrian-city/?page=all, 4 
February 2012 (accessed 14 February 2013)  
2 Editors, Legitimising Violence in Reporting on International Conflict, News Unspun, 
http://www.newsunspun.org/article/legitimising-violence-in-reporting-on-international-conflict, 4 February 2013 
(accessed 4 February 2013)  
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greater human tragedy.1 Although  there  is  little  to  substantiate  the  claims  of  the  
opinion articles, only the words of the piece.  
Another opinion article in the New York Times follows a similar vein, and is 
calling for an aggressive military approach to ‘solving’ the crisis. “It is time to alter 
the Syrian balance of power enough to give political compromise a chance and 
Assad no option but departure. That means an aggressive program to train and arm 
the Free Syrian Army. It also means McCain’s call to use U.S. cruise missiles to 
destroy Assad’s aircraft on the runway is daily more persuasive.”2 There seems to 
be little or no reflection on the issues of legality and consequences of such actions, 
only the presumption that such actions are completely just.  
Predictions have been circulating about the US eventually becoming 
involved directly in the armed conflict. For instance, the former lead State 
Department diplomat on Syria, Fredrik Hof, made such a prediction at a public 
event in Washington DC recently. “One way or the other, the United States is 
going to be sucked into this.”3 This statement clearly implies that direct 
involvement in the armed conflict would not be a conscious decision, but a matter 
of time and fate. However, other reports would seem to cast doubt upon the notion 
of the US as slowly and unconsciously drifting towards conflict. With echoes of 
the Libya campaign, General Dempsey told the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that “we have looked at a number of [military] options that could be involved here” 
in order to halt the killings of unarmed protesters by the Syrian security 
forces.4This reveals a number of significant inconsistencies in US statements and 
actions. Firstly, they are not arming insurgent forces, but only providing non-lethal 
                                                             
1Shaikh, S., Preventing a Syrian Civil War, The New York Times, 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/opinion/preventing-a-syrian-civil-war.html, 12 October 2011 (accessed 13 
February 2013)  
2 Cohen, R., Intervene in Syria, The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/opinion/global/roger-cohen-intervene-in-syria.html, 4 February 2013 
(accessed 14 February 2013) 
3Sen, A. K., Ex-State Dept. Official: US Will Get ‘Sucked In’ to Syria War, The Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/8/ex-state-dept-official-us-will-get-sucked-syria-wa/, 8 
February 2013 (accessed 11 February 2013) 
4 Wong, K., US Prepares Basic Plans to Attack Syria, The Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/7/us-prepares-basic-plans-attack-syria/?page=all, 7 March 
2012 (accessed 13 February 2013)  
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aid. Yet in the first You-tube video link provided in this article, new American 
made weapons are clearly visible. On top of this, provisional plans for invading 
Syria have been drawn up. This has the effect of making official US statements 
seem to be neither consistent nor credible.  
In addition to the US plans for intervention, the United Nations seems to be 
in the process of preparing the way to creating contingency plans to send an 
international military force in to Syria in the event of the Syrian government’s 
collapse according to a statement received from the UN Peacekeeping Chief 
HerveLadsous. The article stated that he [Ladsous] confirmed that “the United 
Nations is drawing up contingency plans to send a possible international force to 
Syria if the government collapses, but the UN peacekeeping chief gave no 
details.”1 However,  the  practical  ability  for  the  UN  to  achieve  this  seems  to  be  
unclear. For instance, the nature of the military force and pledges of manpower, 
material and finances by member states makes this proposition seem like a very 
difficult task to achieve.  
Conclusion 
In spite of the historical legacy of the Fourth Estate role played by Western 
journalism, there is little to no evidence (among the articles that have been 
scrutinised in this article) of the mass media playing an independent or critical role 
in analysing the war in Syria. Articles appearing in the mass media tend to agree 
with and develop the narratives and argumentation advanced by Western 
politicians and others that have a definite set of narrow interests in Syria and the 
attempted act of regime change.  
Contemporary wars are composed of two elements that exist simultaneously, 
the physical fighting that is present on the battlefield and the information war that 
is directed to combatants and non-combatants alike. The physical fighting aspect is 
experienced and the effects of the information war are perceived by those that are 
exposed to these elements. An important aspect to information war to consider is 
                                                             
1 Staff Writers, UN Sending Chemical Weapons Kits to Syria Monitors, Space Wars (AFP), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/UN_sending_chemical_weapons_kits_to_Syria_monitors_999.html, 17 
December 2012 (accessed 8 January 2013) 
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that perception often trumpets reality when it comes to shaping and influencing 
opinion. What is perceived may not necessarily be true in the real sense, but it is 
what a target audience is likely to react to.  
Simplistic narratives have been orchestrated by politics and perpetuated in 
the mass media. The way in which the ‘reality’ is constructed leaves no room for 
middle ground or compromise. Assad is personified as being the picture of evil and 
brutality, willing to slaughter his own people for private gain (staying in power). 
The insurgent and terrorist forces that are aligned against him are pictured as 
fighting for Syria, democratic and an inclusive force for good, and Syria’s bright 
future post-Assad. When this depiction is subjected to critical analysis, the façade 
soon crumbles, and reveals that a lot of information that contradicts this image is 
excluded from the news. This adheres to Philip Taylor’s principle that if one is to 
tell a lie, it is best to leave information out rather than tell a deliberate lie.  
In order to shape and harness the power of public opinion in order to realise 
pre-determined policy there must be some sort of basis to generate and influence a 
target audience. In this regard, the use of a very specific system of rhetoric, 
descriptions and labels are used to shape public perception of the conflict. Rhetoric 
used in reporting varies depending on who the subject of the reporting is at the 
time. When describing and reporting on the actions of Assad and those allied to 
him there is a distinct tendency to use pathos, in order to try and illicit an 
emotional response from the media consumer. The desired response, given the 
nature of the labelling and descriptions falls among the negative emotions 
(loathing, hate, anger … etc.). The actions of the insurgents, US and its allies are 
hedged in logos. Their actions, no matter how reprehensible are explained and 
justified in a calm and logical fashion.  
There has been a call and an attempt to generate the demand for direct 
foreign military intervention by the West in Syria. Two broad avenues have been 
used. The first is to try and justify the demand and need to protect Syrian civilians 
against the Assad regime. That is the West is engaging in an act of an unselfish and 
a  good  global  citizen  that  is  enacting  its  R2P.  A  second  means  is  the  attempt  to  
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portray Syria as a threat to neighbouring countries and even the West, and 
therefore there is a sense of urgency to stop this from happening. The stories 
concerning WMDs illustrate this particular attempt well.  
The final point to make is the issue of ‘inevitability’ that permeates Western 
media reporting. That is Assad and his regime is finished, so therefore why support 
him anymore as it is a futile exercise. By painting an ‘end game’ scenario in Syria, 
the idea is twofold. It is firstly, to try and convince Syrian supporters of Assad to 
give up resistance and join the ‘new’ Syria. And secondly, to influence those 
countries that have not shown support for the insurgents to do so, to ensure that 
they are not left in the cold. The fact that this ‘inevitability’ is taking so long to be 
realised and against all predictions, drives the desire to get more deeply involved in 
overthrowing Assad by all means, including direct military intervention. Like other 
branded revolutions in the past, the Arab Spring is proving no different in terms of 
the large scale instability in the wider region being caused in the name of 
‘democracy’ being ‘promoted’ from foreign sources. This may be the final 
inevitability and verdict of these revolutions.  
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г.Пермь 
РАСШИРЕНИЕ РОЛИ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ В СИСТЕМЕ 
МЕСТНОГО САМОУПРАВЛЕНИЯ 
 
В последние несколько лет в отечественном законодательстве 
наметилась тенденция на усиление роли политических партий на 
региональном и местном уровнях. С одной стороны это связано с тем, что 
политические партии должны выйти из пределов «Садового кольца», с 
другой стороны через партии, можно осуществлять контроль над 
